

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 USIE-00 OIC-04

AEC-11 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 OMB-01 DRC-01 /149 W

----- 102411

O P 121727Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8679

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 16386

SHAPE FOR INTAF: VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL: GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

REF: (A) STATE 222697, (B) BONN 16224, (C) U.S.NATO 5356

BEGIN SUMMARY. IN THE ABSENCE OF DISARMAMENT COMMIS-
SIONER ROTH, EMBOFF MADE THE POINTS IN REF A - PARAS 2,

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6, & 7, PER INSTRUCTIONS NOV 12 WITH RUTH, WHO WAS

ACCOMPANIED BY GERMAN CSCE DEL EXPERT ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. INITIAL GERMAN REACTION TO OUR PRESENTATION WAS NEGATIVE. RUTH DOES NOT SHARE U.S. REASONING ON CBM TYPE MEASURES. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE IN COMMENTING ON U.K. MORATORIUM TYPE PROPOSAL. EMBOFF DID NOT DRAW ON NEW U.S. PAPER (IN STATE 222698) BUT RUTH'S COMMENTS INDICATE THERE WILL BE SOME PROBLEMS ALSO REGARDING AREA OF APPLICATION, PRE-REDUCTION MEASURE III, AND SCENARIO IN PARA 6 OF AMERICAN CONSTRAINTS PAPER. END SUMMARY.

1. MORATORIUM. RUTH SAID HE SHARED U.S. CONCERN THAT SOVIETS MIGHT SEEK TO MANIPULATE U.K. PROPOSAL TO INTERFERE WITH PLANNED OR FUTURE NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. HE REFERRED IN THIS CONNECTION TO RECENT "VOICE OF THE GDR" BROADCAST ATTACKING FRG FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS. RUTH SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES TO RESIST SUCH SOVIET AND WP EFFORTS AT INTERFERENCE, BUT THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THIS PROBLEM WOULD ARISE DURING NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IF NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF A PROPOSED MORATORIUM.

2. RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT MORATORIUM PROPOSAL COULD BE USEFUL TO WEST IN ILLUSTRATING, BY WAY OF OSTENSIBLE REPLY TO SOVIETS REFERENCE TO AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ALLIES INTEND TO EMPHASIZE GROUND FORCES AND TANKS. RUTH BELIEVED IT UNLIKELY THAT, IN FACT, THE SOVIETS WOULD AUGMENT THEIR GROUND FORCES AND/OR EQUIPMENT SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, BONN CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A "DEGREE OF FORMALIZATION" PRECLUDING THAT POSSIBILITY. HE EMPHASIZED, AS REPORTED REF B - PARA 5, THAT MORATORIUM CONCEPT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN RELATIVELY INFORMAL MANNER--HE SPOKE OF OBTAINING SOME TYPE OF "EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING."

3. IN REPLY, EMBOFF PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON DEPT'S ARGUMENT THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE AWAY AT THE OUTSET OF
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THE NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ADEQUATE QUID PRO QUO IN THE CONTEXT OF REDUCTIONS, SOMETHING THE SOVIETS VERY MUCH DESIRE--A CEILING ON NATO FORCES. EMBOFF NOTED RUTH'S JUDGMENT THAT SOVIETS UNLIKELY TO CHEAT ON THIS MATTER AND SAID RUSSIANS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY AN ADEQUATE PRICE IF THE ALLIES EVENTUALLY DETERMINE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO AGREE TO FLA TYPE ARRANGEMENTS. RUTH ACKNOWLEDGED THE FORCE BEHIND THIS ARGUMENT AND

SAID HE WOULD REVIEW THE MATTER AGAIN. HE SAID THAT
GERMANS WERE NOT INSISTING UPON MORATORIUM TYPE PROPOSAL
AS PRECONDITION OF REDUCTION AGREEMENT, BUT HOPED IT
COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN PARALLEL WITH REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF REACHING EARLIER UNDER-
STANDING ON "MORATORIUM." COMMENT. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY
SOME GIVE IN FRG POSITION ON MORATORIUM; POSITION THEY
FINALLY TAKE ON THIS ISSUE PROBABLY WILL DEPEND ON
OVERALL CONSTRAINTS PACKAGE REACHED IN THE ALLIANCE.
END COMMENT.

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4. CBM TYPE MEASURES. RUTH REACTED MORE NEGATIVELY TO EMBOFF'S ARGUMENTATION DRAWN FROM REF A PARA 7 ON INCLUSION OF MEASURES II AND IV IN VIENNA. DESPITE DIFFERING U.S. AND FRG POSITIONS ON PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN CSCE CONTEXT, RUTH SAID BONN LARGELY SHARED AMERICAN GOAL OF LIMITING CSCE/CBM'S ESSENTIALLY TO THE TWO CBM'S ON MANEUVERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REFERRED TO INFORMAL GERMAN QUERY REPORTED IN BONN 16081 (NOTAL) AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT
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DEPT SHORTLY WOULD COMMENT ON THIS IDEA.

5. RUTH SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LOGIC (IN REF A PARA 7) THAT HOLDING BACK MEASURES II AND IV FOR THE TIME BEING IN VIENNA COULD CONSTITUTE INVITATION FOR CSCE TO ESTABLISH MANDATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE GERMAN ANALYSIS IS QUITE THE CONTRARY. RUTH REITERATED ARGUMENTATION IN REF B PARA 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT INTRODUCING MBFR PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES II AND IV IN VIENNA COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO FLATLY OPPOSE ANY MILITARY SECURITY CONTENT IN CSCE, THEREBY OPENING THE DOOR WIDER TO AGGRIEVED NEUTRALS ADVANCING THEIR PET CSCE DISARMAMENT SCHEMES. RUTH AND GERMAN REP IN CSCE MILITARY/SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, WHO WAS PRESENT AT CONVERSATION, SOUGHT TO REBUT U.S. CONCERN OVER CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE. THEY SAID THE NEUTRALS AT GENEVA RECOGNIZE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY FOR MANDATES TO MBFR NEGOTIATORS AND THE EAST IS COMPLETELY OPPOSED. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GIVEN FIRM WESTERN OPPOSITION TO SUCH LINKAGE, FRG DOES NOT SEE A PROBLEM HERE. HOWEVER, RUTH SAID BONN UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. CONCERNS AND AGREED IT WOULD BE BEST TO DROP THE REFERENCE TO CSCE IN BRITISH PAPER ON MBFR PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES (U.S.NATO 5375 - PARA 2).

6. COMMENT--OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. EMBOFF RESTRICTED HIS PRESENTATION TO INSTRUCTIONS IN REF A, MAKING NO REFERENCE TO NEW U.S. PAPER TRANSMITTED IN STATE 222698. HOWEVER, RUTH'S REMARKS DURING NOV 12 TALK AND HIS COMMENTS REPORTED REF B HIGH LIGHTED OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS THAT BONN MAY HAVE WITH NEW U.S. PRESENTATION ON STABILIZING MEASURES. IN PARTICULAR, BONN IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT ARGUMENT THAT PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES INVOLVE "THE FIRST INSTANCE" OF AREA ISSUE IN WHICH FOCUS WOULD BE ON CENTRAL EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRG WILL WISH TO AVOID ANY MEASURE

THAT COULD SET A PRECEDENT PRECLUDING LATER APPLICATION
OF CONSTRAINTS OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS BEYOND
NGA --PARTICULARLY TO HUNGARY. WE EXPECT U.S. PROPOSALS
ON PRE-REDUCTION MEASURE III AND CONSTRAINTS LIMITING
MOVEMENT OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA RPT WITHIN THE AREA
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WILL ALSO CAUSE PROBLEMS TO BONN. FINALLY, GIVEN LONG
STANDING AND CONTINUING GERMAN EMPHASIS ON PLUMPING
FOR PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINT AGREEMENT, WE EXPECT THAT
AMERICAN SCENARIO IN PARA 6 REF A WILL CAUSE SOME
CONSTERNATION AMONG GERMAN OFFICIALS. ON SCENARIO,
GERMANS ARE LIKELY TO ARGUE THAT STABILIZING MEASURES
PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST MUST BE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED
BETWEEN PRE-REDUCTION AND ACCOMPANYING CONSTRAINTS.
HILLENBRAND

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, TROOP REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BONN16386
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731140/aaaabdnw.tel
Line Count: 243
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) STATE 222697, (B) BONN 16224, (C,) U.S.NATO 5356
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <24-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS
TAGS: PARM, GE, NATO, CSCE, WTO, MBFR
To: STATE NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005